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payee is fictitious when the person actually selecting him and supplying his name to the
maker or drawer knows that he is fictitious.
The justification for the suggested statutory modification raises the further question
of why the forgery of a principal's indorsement by an agent authorized to deal with
negotiable paper should not pass title to a bonafide taker for value. Title does pass in
the essentially similar situation when the agent "indorses" the name of the fictitious
payee since the paper, being bearer, passes by delivery alone. In fact, the results already reached under the fictitious payee concept and those made possible by the statute
suggested make it difficult to understand why a bonafide holder for value claiming under any forged indorsement is not permitted to recover on the instrument.
Constitutional Law-Reduction of Public Pensions-[Texas].-The plaintiff, a
police officer of Dallas, Texas, had contributed to a voluntary pension fund, and since
retirement had been receiving the stipulated monthly payments. A new pension plan
materially revised pension payments, including the plaintiff's. The plaintiff sued for
reinstatement under the pension law in force at the date of his retirement. Held, the
plaintiff did not have a vested interest in future monthly payments, under the old
statute, but had a mere expectancy that was subject to legislative change. City of
Dallas v. Trammel, Io S.W. (2d) ioog (Tex. 1937).
The instant decision, one of the first to recognize the pension right as a contract
right, takes a more realistic approach to the pension problem than has hither to been
the case under the traditional treatment of the pension as a gratuity. See Gaffney v.
Young, 200 Iowa io3o, 205 N.W. 865 (1925); State v. Board of Trustees, 121 Wis. 44,
98 N.W. 954 (I9O4); Pecoy v. City of Chicago, 265 Ill. 78, io6 N.E. 435 (1914). Since
the employee often accepts a lower wage or as in the instant case makes voluntary contributions and might even refuse more favorable jobs because of the security offered
by pensions, it seems reasonable to assume the employee considers the pension right a
part of his wage contract. See 12 Encyc. Soc. Sci. 65 (1934). The technical contract
requirement of consideration for the state's (or here the city's) promise could be satisfied by the combined elements of long and faithful service, and, in the instant case
voluntary contribution. Cf. Wilson v. Wurlitzer, 48 Ohio App. 450, 194 N.E. 441
(I934); Schofield v. Zion's Cooperative Mercantile Institution, 85 Utah 281, 39 P. (2d)
342 (i934) (in both cases long and faithful service was held consideration sufficient to
bind private employers to pension agreements).
Nevertheless, even though the plaintiff is said to have a contractual right to a
pension, it may be desirable to allow modification of this right. As the Texas and
other courts have recognized, flexibility may be necessary to preserve the pension
system in times of economic maladjustment. See Casserly v. City of Oakland, 56 P.
(2d) 377 (Cal. 1936). This need may be especially pressing if the pension funds
being separate have been depleted by economic distress. Moreover, since price levels
will fall during such periods, a reasonably reduced pension may not be too harsh on
the employee. In making pension adjustments, however, it should be kept in mind
that because of the expectancy of the employee, because of the pension's beneficial
effect on morale and efficiency, and because pension payments going to low income
bracket groups may serve to prime the pump for recovery, pension reductions should
come as one of the last items in governmental economies.
There is no express power analogous to that over corporations in the Texas statutes
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on which the court could have relied in validating the pension adjustment. The
court did rely, however, on an implied reserve power which was obviously a child of
necessity. However, several more substantial rationales might have been employed.
For instance, it is well established that legislatures can change the salaries of public
employees. State v. Board of Trustees, 121 Wis. 44, 98 N.W. 954 (x9o4); Taylor v.
Beckham, 178 U.S. 548 (1899). See also 2 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 403 (1934). Therefore
it might not be unreasonable to assume that the parties understood that the legislature
intended that pension payments might also be altered. Such an understanding would
make legislative control in implied term in the pension arrangement. Another suggestion, that pensions are deferred wages, would also reach the same result on the basis of
the salary change rule. See 12 Encyc. Soc. Sci. 65 (1934). Cf. Casserly v. City of
Oakland, 56 P. (2d) 237, 238 (Cal. 1936). A third approach would be to invoke the
doctrine preventing a state from contracting away powers affecting public health,
safety or morals. See Denver & Rio Grande R.R. v. Denver, 250 U.S. 241 (1919);
New Orleans Public Ser., Iw. v. New Orleans, 281 U.S. 682 (1930). See also Merrill,
Application of the Obligation of Contract Clause to State Promises, 8o U. of Pa. L.
Rev. 639 (1932). This doctrine might well have been extended to invalidate long
term contracts which would otherwise prevent a reasonable exercise of the police
power. In the instant case, therefore, the court could more cogently have argued that
the pension system promotes efficient public service the control of which is squarely
within the police power, that frequently the maintenance of a pension system depends
on its financial adjustment, and that therefore the state must retain the power to
adjust pension payments.
However, whatever the rationale used to justify the change, the acceptance of the
contract theory points to judicial review of the reasonableness of the adjustments
rather than absolute legislative control in regard to changes in pension arrangements.
Corporate Reorganization-Allowance of Fees-Finality of State Court Decree
in Subsequent § 77B Proceedings-[Federal].--In a state foreclosure proceeding a final
decree of foreclosure was entered, providing, inter alia, that certain fees to the trustee
and his counsel for "services rendered and to be rendered" should be allowed as prior
liens upon the premises. A year later, the property not yet having been sold under the
foreclosure decree, a petition for reorganization under § 77B of the Bankruptcy Act
was filed. 48 Stat. giI (I934); ii U.S.C.A. 207 (r936). The trustee and his counsel,
the appellants in this proceeding, claimed the full amount given them by the state
court decree. After the plan had been accepted by the requisite number of creditors
(not including the appellants), the district court reduced the appellants' claims. On
appeal, held, reversed. The district court was not at liberty to consider the reasonableness of the fees fixed by the state court. It had power to reduce only those fees allowed
for "services to be rendered." It re De Luxe Apartment Hotel Bldg., 86 F. (2d) 772
(C.C.A. 7 th 1936).
Full recognition of allowances made in prior proceedings will necessitate either an
increase in the percentage of reorganized properties to be allocated for fees or a disproportionate reduction in fees allowed claimants for services performed in § 77B
proceedings. Either result is unfortunate. Section 77B (i) authorizes the judge in
reorganization to "make such orders as he may deem equitable ....for the payment
of such reasonable administrative expenses and allowances in the prior proceeding as

